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Employment Law: Classification in Oklahoma Public
Employment: Does It Really Matter?
L Introduction
In 1959, Oklahoma created the Merit System of Personnel Administration (Merit
System).' This Act established the first uniform system of job classification and
discharge and suspension procedures for Oklahoma state employees. Before the
Oklahoma legislature passed this Act, each state agency or department had its own
rules and regulations concerning employment status and discharge and suspension
procedures Once enacted, the Merit System provided certain state employees
specific protections (e.g., it required just cause for removing employees). The
system's goal was to establish a stable and experienced government work force.
The 1959 statute delineated which offices and positions fell under the Merit
System (classified employees) and those which did not fall under the Merit System
(unclassified employees)? The statute also specified that the chief administrative
officer of each state agency was responsible for designating classified positions
within the agency.4 A 1994 amendment to the statute defined "classified service" as
state employees and positions under the jurisdiction of the Merit System The
amendment further defined "unclassified service!' or "exempt service" as those
employees and positions excluded from coverage under the Merit System.
6
Today, Oklahoma has a comprehensive set of statutes governing all aspects of
public employment in Oklahoma.7 The Oklahoma Personnel Act deals with the
status and job classifications of employees.' Section 840-6.5 of the Personnel Act
specifically addresses discharge and suspension procedures A separate Oklahoma
statute, title 51, section 24.1, also stipulates discharge and suspension procedures for
officers or employees of the state.'
These two statutes appear to overlap, but section 840-6.5 limits any suspension of
a classified employee to a time not to exceed sixty days." Conversely, section 24.1
allows for an indefinite suspension of all state employees convicted of a felony,
regardless of classification."2 These two statutes conflict when a classified employee
1. See 74 OKLA. STAT. ch. 27 (1981).
2. See id. § 809 (repealed 1982).
3. See id. §§ 803, 808 (repealed 1982).
4. See 74 OKLA. STAT. § 840-4.3 (Supp. 1999).
5. See 74 OKLA. STAT. § 840-1.3.
6. See id.
7. See 74 OKLA. STAT. ch. 27A (Supp. 1999).
8. See id.
9. See id. §§ 840-4.1 to -6.2, 6.5.
10. See 51 OKLA. STAT. § 24.1 (Supp. 1999).
11. See 74 OKLA. STAT. § 840-6.5.
12. 51 OKLA. STAT. § 24.1 (Supp. 1999).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2000
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
is convicted of a felony. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma addressed this conflict in
the 1998 case of State v. Ferrell.3
In Ferrell, the Oklahoma Military Department fired a classified state employee
following an investigation for misuse of state funds. An administrative law judge
later found the discharge wrongful and ordered the Military Department to rehire the
employee. The employee then filed for back pay between the time of the discharge
and the time of reinstatement. The Military Department refused the back pay request.
Declining to apply a statute specifically governing the discharge of classified
employees, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma upheld the agency's decision to deny the
back pay."
In Ferrell, the supreme court settled a conflict between two Oklahoma statutes that
regulate discharge and suspension procedures for public employees. While one statute
provides specific protections for classified employees under the state's Merit
Protection System, the other statute provides no such protections and ostensibly
applies to all state employees, regardless of classification. 6 The supreme court
decided in favor of the latter statute and held that the state no longer affords the
screen of the Merit System to classified employees convicted of a felony. 7
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma correctly held that section 24.1 of the Oklahoma
Statutes applies to all state employees, regardless of classification. However, the
court's failure to address the back pay issue raises serious questions as to Oklahoma's
position on back pay and wages for wrongful termination. Part II of this note
discusses the history of Oklahoma law prior to Ferrell, offering insight into the
reasoning of the Ferrell court. Part I outlines the reasoning behind the court's
decision. In Part IV, an examination of Ferrell presents the possible impact the
decision could have on Oklahoma state employees. Finally, Part V suggests that
Ferrell could have an adverse effect on Oklahoma public employees and the status
of the law in Oklahoma.
IL Historical Background
A. Civil Service and Due Process in Public Employment Law
Classified state employees enjoy protections that their private sector counterparts
do not. For example, the State of Oklahoma ensures job security for state employees
through the Merit Protection System. The United States Constitution also limits
the way in which a public employer can deal with its employees. 9 A review of
13. 959 P.2d 576 (Okla. 1998).
14. See id. at'579.
15. See 74 OKLA. STAT. § 840-6.5 (Supp. 1999).
16. See 51 OKLA. STAT. § 24.1 (Supp. 1999).
17. See Ferrell, 959 P.2d at 578-79.
18. See CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 337 (1993).
Civil service systems, like Oklahoma's Merit Protection System, "are characterized by 'merit hiring'
(usually by competitive examinations) and the extension of job security to persons hired after they have
successfully completed a 'probationary' period." Id.




United States Supreme Court decisions addressing public employment identifies these
constitutional limits.
In its earliest public employment decisions, the Supreme Court reasoned that unless
otherwise provided by statute, public employees are merely employees-at-will. ° At-
will employment means that any employment contract not for a definite time is
terminable at will by either party for any reason, good or bad, or for no reason.2'
"[Tihe power of removal is incident to the power of appointment."'
In the early 1950s, however, the Supreme Court began to apply due process
protections to public employment and move away from employment-at-will.' In the
1952 case of Wieman v. Updegraff,24 the Supreme Court struck down an Oklahoma
statute requiring all state employees to sign a loyalty oath avowing that they had
never been associated with any Communist or subversive group.' The Court
reasoned that a state may not condition employment on membership rosters unless
the state gives the person the opportunity to explain the circumstances surrounding
the membership.' The basis of the Court's decision in Wieman was that
constitutional protection extends to the public employee when the state treats the
employee in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.!7
The Wieman decision was a precursor to several Supreme Court rulings that
individual states could not withhold employment or terminate employees who had a
property interest in employmente without applying constitutional due process
20. See Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 425 (1901) (stating public employees subject to
removal "at the will of the power appointing them" unless any causes of removal are prescribed by law);
Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324,343 (1897) (recognizing and applying at-will doctrine); Exparte
Hennen, 38 U.S. 230, 258 (1839) (stating public officers are movable at pleasure... without requiring
any cause for such removal").
21. See SuLLIvAN, supra note 18, at 477; see also Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Oklahoma's At-Will Rule:
Heeding the Warnings of America's Evolving Employment Law?, 39 OKLA. L. Ray. 373, 373 (1986).
22. Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 424 (1901).
23. See Erik K. Foster, Federal Pre-Termination Rights for State Employees: Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 1069, 1071 (1984); see also Daniel T. Gallagher, 1996-97
Annual Survey of Labor and Employment Law: Constitutional Developments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 365, 465
(1998) (noting shift in public policy caused the Supreme Court to weigh the competing private and public
interests as well as the risk of erroneous deprivation of a property interest in continued employment).
24. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
25. See id, at 191-92; see also 51 OKLA. STAT. § 2 (Supp. 1999) (providing for a loyalty oath for
all Oklahoma state employees); 51 OKLA. STAT. §§ 36.1, 36.2A (1991) (same).
26. See Wieman, 344 U.S. at 190. The court stated:
But membership may be innocent. A state servant may have joined a proscribed
organization unaware of its activities and purposes. In recent years, many completely
loyal persons have severed organizational ties after learning for the first time of the
character of groups to which they had belonged. "They had joined, [but] did not know
what it was, they were good, fine young men and women, loyal Americans, but they had
been trapped into it because one of the great weaknesses of all Americans, whether adult
or youth, is to join something .... "
Id. (quoting Hearings on H.R. 1884 and H.R. 2122 Before House Comm. on Un-American Activities, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1962) (testimony of J. Edgar Hoover)).
27. See id. at 192.
28. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ("Property interests [] are not created
2000]
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procedures." In the landmark case of Cleveland Board of Education v. Louder-
mill," the Supreme Court held that an employer cannot discharge a tenured public
employee without some pretermination right to respond to the charges, regardless of
the procedures set forth in the state statute.
In Loudermill, the Cleveland Board of Education fired a security guard for failing
to disclose a prior felony conviction on his job application.3 ' The guard appealed,
and in a post-termination hearing, the Cleveland Civil Service Commission upheld
the dismissal.33 The Loudermill Court reasoned that public employees' constitutional
claims depend on their having had a property right in continued employment.'
Further, if the employee does have a property right, then a state cannot deprive him
of this property without due process.35 The Court explained that since the guard was
a classified civil service employee, he possessed a property interest in continued
employment.' The Court concluded that public employees with property interests
in continued employment have a constitutional due process right to a pretermination
hearing.37
Since Loudermill, pretermination proceedings have developed into a means of
providing "the employing agency with information from which it may determine
whether reasonable grounds exist to believe the charges against the employee are
true."3 This pretermination proceeding is not a trial. A full adversarial eviden-
by the Constitution [but] are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law[,] rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims
of entitlement to those benefits."); see also Peter N. Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court:
A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71 CAL L. REv. 146, 192 (1983) (arguing that sovereign states define
terms of property rights, but federal courts are "ultimate arbiters" of constitutional due process). See
generally Rosario-Torres v. Hemandez-Colon, 889 F.2d 314, 319 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that "tihe
sufficiency of a claim of entitlement to a property interest in public employment must be measured by
and decided with reference to local law").
29. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (holding that a public employee with a
property interest is entitled to due process guarantees). But see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577-78 (1972) (stating that property interests are not created by the United States Constitution but rather
by existing rules such as state law and that Wisconsin statutes do provide for a property interest of non-
tenured state professors).
30. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
31. See id at 540-41.
32. See id at 535. The security guard stated on his job application that he had never been convicted
of a felony. See id In fact, he had been convicted of grand larceny in 1968. See id. The guard argued
that he had not knowingly lied on the application. See id. He maintained that he had mistakenly thought
his 1968 conviction, which resulted in only a fine and six-month suspended sentence, was for a
misdemeanor, rather than a felony. See id
33. See id. at 535-36.
34. See id at 538.
35. See id
36. See id at 538-39.
37. See id at 542.
38. Daniel J. Gamino, State Employee Discipline: Can the Law Level the Playing Field Between
David and Goliath?, 68 OKLA. BJ. 3411, 3411 (1997). But see N.J. REv. STAT. § IIA:2-13 (1993)
(providing that a New Jersey public employee may be suspended without a hearing pending disposition




tiary hearing is not required. Rather, the proceeding is merely an initial check
against mistaken decisions.4! ' The standard of proof is whether by a preponderance
of the evidence there are reasonable grounds to believe the charges are true.42
Agency pretermination practices vary significantly. "Some agencies have the
ultimate decision-maker personally preside at the pre-termination proceeding."43
Generally, "agencies appoint an attorney or intermediate officer to take the evidence
and report to the appointing authority."" The agency may also have a complete set
of rules outlining the pretermination procedures.45
B. Oklahoma At-Will Doctrine and the Merit Protection System
While the United States Supreme Court moved toward providing due process
protection for public employees, Oklahoma also took steps to provide additional
protection for state employees. Oklahoma's 1959 adoption of the Merit System
created such protection. As codified from the 1959 Act, the Merit System's stated
purpose was "to provide all citizens a fair and equal opportunity for public service,
to establish conditions of service which will attract officers and employees of
character and ability."'
The Merit System statute also provides that a state agency may terminate an
employee in the classified service only for cause.47 Classified service refers to "state
employees and positions under the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Merit System of
Personnel Administration."' The chief administrative officer of each state agency,
the appointing authority,49 is responsible for designating classified positions within
the agency." The 1959 Merit System statute outlined the specific offenses for which
an employer could terminate a classified employee.5 Some offenses included
is committed on the job or directly related to the job).
39. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545 (stating that some kind of hearing must be held).
40. See id. at 545-46; see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582 (1975) (holding that a hearing for
suspension of students at a school may be as little as an informal opportunity for the student to tell his
side of the story); Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139, 1145 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating
that a pre-termination hearing is proper when it consists of asking the officer for his explanation when
a urine sample reveals inhalation of marijuana).
41. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-56.
42. See id.
43. Gamino, supra note 38, at 3411.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. 74 OKLA. STAT. § 801 (1981) (repealed 1982).
47. See 74 OKLA. STAT. § 840-6.5 (Supp. 1999).
48. l. § 840-1.3(7).
49. See id. § 840-1.3(3).
50. See id. § 840-4.3.
51. See id § 812. The statute stated:
The State Personnel Board by rule shall establish a procedure in accordance with the
provisions of this Act for the suspension, reduction in pay, demotion, and discharge of
employees in the classified service for misconduct, insubordination, inefficiency, habitual
drunkenness, inability to perform the duties of the position in which employed, willful
violation of the provisions of the rules proscribed by this Act or the State Personnel
2000]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2000
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
misconduct, insubordination, and conduct unbecoming a public employee 2 A 1984
amendment changed the statute and added a sixty-day maximum period for
suspension without pay for any classified employee.'
Under the standard put forth in Loudermill, a classified employee discharged for
any of the reasons identified in the Merit System statute is entitled to a preter-
mination hearing concerning the discharge.' This right to a hearing is also codified
in title 74, section 840-6.5(B):
Before any [termination] action is taken against a permanent classified
employee, the employing agency ... shall provide the employee with a
written statement of the specific acts or omissions that are causes or
reasons for the proposed action, an explanation of the agency's evidence,
and an opportunity to present reasons why the proposed action is
improper ss
C. State Officer and Employees
While the Merit System gave protections to certain state employees, in 1965 the
Oklahoma legislature adopted a separate statute, title 51, section 24.1, relating
directly to the suspension of state officers and employees.' This statute, while not
Board, conduct unbecoming a public employee, conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or any other just cause.
Id.
52. See id.
53. 74 OKLA. STAT. § 840-6.5(B). The amendment reads:
Any employee in the classified service may be discharged, suspended without pay for not
to exceed sixty (60) calendar days, or demoted by the agency, department, institution, or
officer by whom employed for misconduct, insubordination, inefficiency, habitual
drunkenness, inability to perform the duties of the position in which employed, willful
violation of the Oklahoma Personnel Act or of the rules prescribed by the Office of
Personnel Management or by the Oklahoma Merit Protection Commission, conduct
unbecoming a public employee, conviction of a crime of moral turpitude, or any other just
cause.
Id.
54. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1985).
55. 74 OKLA. STAT. § 840-6.5(B).
56. See Act of June 28, 1965, ch. 345, § 1, 1965 Okla. Sess. Laws 603 (codified as amended at 51
OKLA. STAT. § 24.1 (Supp. 1999)).
Section 1. Suspension from office or employment upon conviction of felony
From and after the effective date of this act, any elected or appointed state officer or
employee who, during the term for which he was elected or appointed, is, or has been,
found guilty by a trial court of a felony in a court of competent jurisdiction shall be
automatically suspended from said office or employment. Such suspension shall continue
until such time as said conviction is reversed by the highest appellate court to which said
officer or employee may appeal.
Section 2. Rejection of salary claims - Payment of back salary on reversal
The State Budget Officer is hereby directed to reject all claims for payment of salary
or wages to any such officer or employee during the period. Provided however, that in
the event of reversal of any conviction upon appeal, all claims for payment of salary or




within the Merit System, mandated that agencies suspend any elected or appointed
state officer or employee found guilty of a felony.' The statute provided for in-
definite suspension, without pay, of an employee convicted of a felony." The statute
further stated that in the case of the reversal of a conviction, an agency shall allow
all claims for salary or wages that accrued during the suspension period."s However,
in a 1981 amendment the Oklahoma legislature deleted this back pay provision in the
case of a conviction reversal."
In 1981 a controversy developed as to whether this statute also applied to county
employees." The Governor of Oklahoma called a special session of the Oklahoma
legislature. He requested the session primarily to implement legislation concerning
a large number of county commissioners under indictment in federal court. The
Governor asked the Oklahoma legislature to amend section 24.1 to include county
officers and employees in the list of individuals automatically suspended upon a
felony conviction.' The Oklahoma legislature did amend section 24.1 and added
language that mandated a suspension for state or county officers or employees who
plead guilty or nolo contendre in a state or federal court."
In Young v. Town of Morris," a 1915 case, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
decided that the right to salary attaches to the public officer irrespective of protracted
absence or nonperformance of duties.' The court also stated, however, that the
Oklahoma legislature may statutorily modify this right to salary." Section 24.1
modifies this right to salary by providing for suspension of a public officer or
employee without pay6 Section 24.1 allows for this suspension until the highest
applicable appellate court either affirms or reverses the conviction or guilty plea.'
Title 74, section 840-6.5 of the Oklahoma Statutes also allows for suspension without





60. See 51 OKLA. STAT. § 24.1 (Supp. 1999); 51 OKLA. STAT. § 24.2 (1971) (repealed 1981).
61. See Worley v. State, 558 P.2d 430, 433 (1976) (holding that the 1971 version of section 24.1
applied only to officers or employees compensated through the state budget officer and does not apply
to county commissioners).
62. See Exec. Order No. 81-1, 1981 Okla. Sess. Laws 1318.
63. See 51 OKLA. STAT. § 24.1 (Supp. 1999). The amendment added a sentence reading as follows:
In the event any elected or appointed state or county officer or employee who, during the
term for which he was elected or appointed, pleads guilty or nolo contendre to a felony
or any offense involving a violation of his official oath in a state or federal court of
competent jurisdiction, he shall, immediately upon the entry of said plea, forfeit said
office or employment.
Id.
64. 150 P. 684 (Okla. 1915).
65. See itt at 686.
66. See id.
67. See 51 OKLA. STAT. § 24.1(A).
68. See id.
69. See 74 OKLA. STAT. § 840-6.5(B) (Supp. 1999).
20001
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to conflict until 1990, when the Oklahoma Military Department denied John Porter
back wages under section 24.1, an action giving rise to the case of State v. Ferrell.
Ilf. State v. Ferrell
A. Facts
In State v. Ferrell, the Oklahoma Military Department discharged John Porter, a
permanent classified employee, in 1988 following an investigation by the Attorney
General's Office into "allegations of self-dealing and misuse of state funds.""7 The
employee filed an appeal with the Merit Protection Commission."' An administrative
law judge reduced the discharge to a thirty-day suspension. The Military Department
reinstated the employee in May 1990.'2
In October 1991, however, a trial court convicted the employee of thirty-six felony
counts of filing false travel claims. In January 1992, the employee pled nolo
contendre to eleven felony counts of embezzlement of state funds and destruction of
public records. All criminal acts occurred prior to the employee's termination in
1988. Pursuant to title 51, section 24.1 of the Oklahoma Statutes, the Military
Department again discharged the employee based on his felony convictions. The
employee then filed an action with the Merit Protection Commission for back pay,
wages and benefits for the period of December 1988 through February 1992, the time
between the two discharges.'
The Merit Protection Commission decided that title 74, section 840-6.5 was the
only applicable provision to the discharge of a permanent classified state employee
and that title 51, section 24.1 was not controlling. The district court came to the
same conclusion and ordered the payment of Porter's back wages, benefits, and
interest.74 The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the ruling, and the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma granted certiorari. 5
B. Issue
The issue presented to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma was whether section 840-
6.5 took "precedence over section 24.1 . . . with respect to a classified state
employee's discharge and forfeiture of wages based upon a felony conviction."76 To
determine this question the court faced two preliminary issues: first, whether it was
possible to construe the statutes as consistent with one another; and second, whether
by its terms, section 24.1 applies to all state employees regardless of their clas-
sification.





75. See id.; see also Appellee's Petition for Rehearing on Certiorari at 15, State v. Ferrell, 959 P.2d
576 (Okla. 1998) (No. 82,011).





The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the two provisions did not conflict.,
The court stated that section 24.1 operates "as an overarching provision applicable
to all state and county officers and employees without regard to whether one of the
grounds for discipline enumerated in section 840-6.5(B) Title 74 is also present.""8
The court further held that "section 24.1's forfeiture provisions merely augment the




The Ferrell court began its analysis by addressing the statutory construction of the
two statutes." "The 'fundamental rule' of statutory construction is to ascertain the
intent of the [Oklahoma] Legislature and [i]f possible construe them so as to render
them consistent with one another."'" The court relied on precedent in applying the
rules of construction to the statutes in question.'
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals resolved the conflict by determining that
"the [Oklahoma] Legislature must have intended that only 'unclassified employees'
be subject to forfeiture of position and benefits upon conviction of a felony."'
However, the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not agree and stated that section 24.1
applied in this instance because the statute provided that "any .. .officer or
employee" convicted of a felony is subject to forfeiture." In explanation the
Oklahoma Supreme Court cited Shattuck v. Grider' for the judicial definition of the
word "any" to mean "every" and "all."' The Ferrell court went on to state that the
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals' finding did not "further the mandated goal of
harmonizing two [statutory] provisions without violence to either.""
The Ferrell court further reasoned that "the [Oklahoma] Legislature's decision that
a convicted felon forfeits [his] public position and benefits in no way conflicts with
77. See id. at 578-79.
-78. Id.
79. ld. at 579.
80. See id. at 577.
81. Id. (quoting Sharp v. Tulsa County Election Bd., 890 P.2d 836, 840 (Okla. 1994)).
82. See Forston v. Heisler, 341 P.2d 252, 253 (Okla. 1959). The Forston court held that
in construing statutes, harmony, not confusion, is to be sought and when two acts or parts
thereof are reasonably susceptible of a construction that will give effect to both and the
words of each, without violence to either, it should be adopted in preference to one which,
though reasonable, leads to the conclusion that there is a conflict.
Id.
83. Ferrell, 959 P.2d at 578.
84. Id.
85. 493 P.2d 829 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
86. Id. at 830.
87. Ferrell, 959 P.2d at 578.
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its decision that classified employees may be discharged only for just cause."" The
court stated that section 24. I's forfeiture provision merely augments the discipline and
discharge procedures for permanent classified employees found at section 840-6.5."
Therefore, section 840-6.5 does not take precedence over section 24.1.
2. Dissenting Opinion
In a 6-2 decision, the dissent read section 24.1 not as applying to "any" state
employee but only applying to elected or appointed state officers or to any employee
of such officers. In relying on this argument, the dissent used the remaining language
in section 24.1 to support the interpretation that the statute's intent applies only to the
employees of elected or appointed officers.'
The dissent reasoned that section 24.1 deals specifically with the various
procedures and regulations of state officers.9' The section addresses the forfeiture
of retirement benefits by "such officer or employee."' In addition to its forfeiture
language, section 24.1 also sets out procedures for filling a forfeited office."
Therefore, section 24.1 applies exclusively to elected or appointed officers and their
employees. The dissent further stated that with title 51 as a guide, title 74, section
840-6.5 applies only to "classified employees" and does not provide for forfeiture of
back pay for such employees 5
IV. Analysis of the Ferrell Decision
The Ferrell decision suggests that Oklahoma courts do not consider the protections
afforded to employees under the Merit Protection statutes as absolute. Section 840-
6.5, which deals specifically with permanent classified state employees, provides
specific guidelines for discharge and suspension of such employees. 6 Yet, according
to Ferrell, section 24.1 supersedes these guidelines. The provisions of section 24.1
outline discharge procedures for elected or appointed officers or employees convicted
of a felony.'
A. Intent of Title 51, Section 24.1 of Oklahoma Statutes
The key issue in Ferrell appeared to be whether the Oklahoma legislature intended
section 24.1 to apply to all state employees, regardless of classification, or only to
elected or appointed officers and their appointed employees. The original legislative
intent of section 24.1 is unrecorded. The Oklahoma House of Representatives
retained no records or notes of the 1965 proceedings. If the original legislative intent
88. Id. at 579.
89. See id.






96. See 74 OKLA. STAT. § 840-6.5 (Supp. 1999).




of a statute is unknown, then the court must turn to statutory construction.9" In
statutory construction, a court must consider the language of the Legislative Act as
a whole to preserve the remedial purposes of the statute and to avoid incongruous
results." Oklahoma courts have also stated that the law abhors a forfeiture statute
so that courts must strictly construe statutes authorizing such forfeiture."0
An Oklahoma Attorney General Opinion supports the argument that section 24.1
applies only to officers and their employees.'0 ' The opinion reads in part: "The
Governor specifically asked the legislature to amend 51 Okla. Stat. section 24.1 so
that it would include county officers and employees to those individuals automatically
suspended upon a felony conviction."'" While this passage is suggestive of the
overall intent of only the 1981 amendment, it is possible to infer that the Oklahoma
legislature meant to include only elected and appointed officers and their employees
in the original 1965 statute.
Arguably, section 24.1 applies only to elected or appointed officers and their
employees who serve for a specific term of office. In contrast to employees selected
for permanent employment, elected or appointed officers or employees serve only for
a designated period. Title 51 of the Oklahoma statutes deals directly with officers of
the state. Looking to the language of the statute, a court could infer that section 24.1
applies only to state officers or employees who are serving for a specific term of
office. Section 24.1 reads: "[any elected or appointed state or county officer or
employee who, during the term for which he was elected or appointed, is, or has
been, found guilty . . . shall be automatically suspended from said office or
employment."'" At first glance neither permanent employees nor employees on
indefinite status appear to fall under this statute. Nonetheless, the Ferrell court
specifically ruled that section 24.1 applies to all state employees, regardless of
classification. 4
B. Discussion of Back Pay
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma failed to address the real issue of the case, the
employee's claim for back pay, wages, and benefits. Section 24.1 reads specifically
that upon conviction or guilty plea to a felony, suspension without pay is
automatic.'" In Ferrell, the trial court did not convict the employee until October
1991. Yet, the claim for back pay, wages, and benefits was for the period of
December 1988 to February 1992, the period of suspension between the two
discharges. In effect, the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision denied back pay,
98. See Sharp v. Tulsa Co. Election Bd., 890 P.2d 836, 840 (Okla. 1994).
99. See Becknell v. State Indus. Court, 512 P.2d 1180, 1183 (Okla. 1973); see also Oklahoma
Journal Publ'g Co. v. City of Okla. City, 620 P.2d 452, 454 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980).
100. See Pirkey v. State, 327 P.2d 463 (Okla. 1958).
101. See 15 Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. 559 (1984).
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. 51 OKLA. STAT. § 24.1 (Supp. 1999) (emphasis added).
104. See State v. Fenell, 959 P.2d 576 (Okla. 1998).
105. See 51 OKLA. STAT. § 24.1.
2000]
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wages, and benefits for the period of the suspension, which occurred before the
actual felony conviction.
In addition to section 24.1, the Oklahoma Constitution also provides for suspension
of elected officials upon conviction of a felony." 6 The Oklahoma Constitution
further stipulates that if an appellate court reverses a conviction, the elected official
is entitled to accumulated pay and allowances held due to the suspension."° In
Ferrell, the Military Department did not suspend the employee but discharged him
for allegations of a felony."~' The administrative law judge found this discharge
improper and ordered reinstatement with a thirty-day suspension. Although the judge
held the discharge improper, the Military Department did not pay the employee back
wages for the time of discharge."°
Section 24.1 provides only that a suspension shall continue until the appropriate
court reverses the conviction or plea."' It does not state what actions an agency
must take when it cancels such a suspension. The statute does not address back pay,
wages, or benefits. Nevertheless, it seems questionable whether section 24.1 applies
in this instance when the application for back pay and wages was for an employment
suspension that occurred before the felony conviction.
For example, the federal government provides specific remedies for unwarranted
discharge or suspension of federal employees. Title 5 U.S.C. § 5596 stipulates that
if an unwarranted or unjustified personnel action affects an employee, the employee
is entitled to back pay and wages during the period of suspension or discharge."'
The State of Oklahoma has no such back pay statute. The Code of Federal
Regulations defines an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action as an act that an
appropriate authority determines is unjustified or unwarranted under applicable
law."
2
106. See OKLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1966 amendment); see also Manning v. State, 123 P. 1029,
1030 (Okla. Crim. App. 1912) (stating that the suspension provision in the Oklahoma Constitution is
founded upon the strong public interest that public affairs not be administered by those who have been
convicted of a serious offense).
107. See OKLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
108. See Ferrell, 959 P.2d at 577.
109. See id.
110. See 51 OKLA. STAT. § 24.1.
Ill. The statute reads as follows:
(b)(1) An employee of an agency who, on the basis of a timely appeal or an
administrative determination (including a decision relating to an unfair labor practice or
a grievance) is found by appropriate authority under applicable law, rule, regulation, or
collective bargaining agreement, to have been affected by an unjustified or unwarranted
personnel action which has resulted in the withdrawal or reduction of all or part of the
pay, allowances, or differentials of the employee -
is entitled, on correction of the personnel action, to receive for the period for which
the personnel action was in effect -
an amount equal to all or any part of the pay, allowances, or differentials, as applicable
which the employee normally would have earned or received during the period if the
personnel action had not occurred, less any amounts earned by the employee through other
employment during that period.
5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(1) (1994).




In Jankowitz v. United States.. the United States Court of Claims directly
addressed the issue of back pay for the unwarranted suspension of a federal
employee. The Jankowitz court held that if an agency follows the applicable
procedural recommendations and safeguards in suspending the employee, a court
could not hold the decision unwarranted or unjustified."" In Jankowitz, a grand jury
indicted an employee of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) for bribery."'
The FHA subsequently suspended the employee because of the indictment."6 A
jury trial later acquitted the employee of all charges and the FHA restored the
employee to duty."7 The agency denied the employee's application for back pay for
the period of his suspension until the time of his acquittal."' The court reasoned
that since the agency followed all applicable procedural rules and safeguards, a court
could not later hold the suspension unwarranted or unjustified."9
Five years after deciding Jankowitz, the United States Court of Claims clarified its
ruling in Summers v. United States." The court stated that its holding in Jankowitz
did not intend for suspension to be reversible if the employing federal agency gave
back pay during the suspension period.'' The court further stated that "[a]gencies
have a certain amount of discretion to determine that an employee has undergone an
unjustified or unwarranted personnel action."' "
In Ferrell, the employee did not dispute the procedure followed in the termination
process. However, in a post-termination appeal, an administrative law judge held the
discharge improper." When an appropriate court finds the discharge improper (i.e.,
unjustified), the court should also question the legitimacy of the agency disallowing
.the employee's back pay. A post-termination appeal, like the one in the Ferrell case,
could take months or even years to complete. A wrongful discharge leaves an
employee without income and also without recourse concerning the back pay if he
"Unjustified or unwarranted personnel action" means an act of commission or an act of
onission . . . that an appropriate authority subsequently determines, on the basis of
substantive or procedural defects, to have been unjustified or unwarranted under applicable
law, Executive order, rule, regulation, or mandatory personnel policy established by an
agency or through a collective bargaining agreement. Such actions include personnel
actions and pay actions (alone or in combination).
5 C.F.R. § 550.803 (1999).
113. 533 F.2d 538 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
114. See id. at 543.
115. See id. at 540.
116. See id.
117. See idt at 540-41.
118. See it at 541.
119. See it; see also Brown v. Department of Justice, 715 F.2d 662, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(declining to follow the reasoning used by the Court of Claims in Jankowitz, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that initial suspension based upon an indictment is proper but went on to
state that, following an acquittal, back pay must be paid to the date the suspension was imposed).
120. 648 F.2d 1324 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
121. See idt at 1329.
122. Id. at 1330.
123. See State v. Ferrell, 959 P.2d 576, 577 (Okla. 1998).
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is later reinstated. Not only is this process unfair but also the innocent employee
suffers the consequences.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed this same
issue in Richardson v. United States Customs Service. The Richardson court held
that it is a federal agency's discretionary decision to determine whether an employee's
reinstatement with pay is effective on the date of reinstatement or on the earlier date
of suspension. "'
In Richardson, a grand jury indicted two Customs Service employees for assaulting
a federal officer. Consequently, the Customs Service suspended both employees
for an indefinite period without pay.2 A trial court subsequently acquitted both
employees. The Customs Service then reinstated the employees with pay,
effective on the date of their acquittal.' The Service denied the employees' claims
for back pay, overtime, and benefits that would have accrued during the time of the
suspension.'"
The Richardson court reasoned that the Customs Service initially had reasonable
grounds to suspend the employees.' The court stated that an agency is neither
required nor precluded from making the reinstatement with back pay retroactive to
the date of suspension.'32 "That decision is a matter for the agency, in the first
instance, to make, based on all the facts and circumstances."'3 The court further
stated, however, that in suspending an employee the agency may not act in an
arbitrary, capricious, or abusive manner.13
Comparing Richardson to Ferrell, one could argue that although the Military
Department believed it had reasonable grounds to discharge the employee, it abused
its discretion in denying back pay upon reinstatement. Despite the alleged misuse of
state funds by the employee, an administrative law judge found the discharge
improper and ordered reinstatement with only a thirty-day suspension. The Military
Department complied by reinstating the employee but denied back pay between the
thirty-day suspension period and the employee's reinstatement. The employee
appealed the decision, but before the court could decide the issue, a trial court
convicted the employee of thirty-six felony counts.'3"
In a similar case, a Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division ruled that an
employee is entitled to back pay and benefits even if the employee pleads guilty to
a felony. In Coping v. New York Transit Authority," the court held that a public
124. 47 F.3d 415 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
125. See id. at 421.





131. See id. at 421.
132. See id.
133. 1d.
134. See 1i at 422.
135. See State v. Fenell, 959 P.2d 576, 577 (Okla. 1998).




employee was entitled to his full wages and benefits from the date thirty days after
his suspension for an indictment of murder until the date when he pled guilty to
manslaughter.'37 The court reasoned that since the applicable New York statute
provided for a maximum thirty-day suspension, an employee suspended for a longer
period is entitled to pay and benefits.3"' "To accede to the request of the appellant
[indefinite suspension without pay] would be tantamount to giving the government
the power to starve the employee while it dallied in the prosecution of charges. In
our view, that is exactly the mischief that the 30-day limitation of the statute sought
to avoid."'39
Justice Thurgood Marshall made the same argument in his concurring opinion in
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill." Justice Marshall stated that the
Court should place a greater emphasis on the accuracy of the pretermination
proceeding. "After wage termination, the employee often must wait months before
his case is finally resolved, during which time he is without wages from his public
employment.'. Justice Marshall continued by noting that the Court accepts an
impermissibly high risk that a wrongfully discharged employee will often be subject
to a lengthy wait for vindication."'
In fact, the employee in Ferrell realized this high risk, and the process subjected
him to such a lengthy wait. The post-termination appeal took almost two years to
complete."3 During this time, the wrongful discharge left the employee with no
income. Further, once it reinstated the employee, the Military Department did not
provide him with back pay.'" The employee in Ferrell experienced the precise
problem outlined by the Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division and Justice
Marshall.
C. Possible Impact of the Ferrell Case
Is a classified Oklahoma public employee entitled to back pay, wages, and benefits
upon reinstatement for a wrongful discharge or suspension? Arguably, the Merit
Protection Commission addressed this question when it limited suspension of a
classified employee to a maximum sixty days."5 Thus, a classified employee could
lose back pay, wages, and benefits, but for no more than sixty days. However, the
Ferrell decision suggests that a classified employee is not entitled to back pay.
Certainly, under section 24.1, a convicted felon is not granted back pay. But in
Ferrell, both the discharge and the reinstatement took place prior to the felony
conviction. The decision implies that section 24.1 controls even previous claims to
back pay that occurred before a felony conviction.
137. See iad at 621.
138. See id. at 622.
139. Id. at 622.
140. 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 549.
142. See i
143. See State v. Ferrell, 959 P.2d 576, 577 (Okla. 1998).
144. See id.
145. See 74 OKLA. STAT. § 840-1.3 (Supp. 1999).
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Oklahoma has no statutory provisions addressing the rights of employees upon
wrongful discharge or suspension. However, the Oklahoma Constitution provides that
an elected official who has a felony conviction reversed is entitled to accumulated
back pay from the time of suspension." Hence, the Oklahoma Constitution protects
elected officials, but other state employees have no recourse if they are later
vindicated of a wrongful suspension or discharge. This policy is neither fair nor in
the best interests of the public. An employee wrongfully accused may suffer loss of
job, pay, and benefits even if the agency never proves the charges. A state agency
might reinstate the employee if the discharge is improper, but there is no avenue
available for the recovery of back pay. This process subjects employees, especially
those supporting families, to severe hardship.
Some employees deserve the discharge or suspension they receive. However, the
hardship forced upon innocent employees may outweigh the policy of suspension or
discharge without pay. Suspending an employee with pay alleviates such a hardship.
It also forces the agency to an expedient exercise of justice.
In the Ferrell case, once the employee had the opportunity to test the strength of
the evidence against him by confronting and cross-examining adverse witnesses and
presenting witnesses on his own behalf, the administrative law judge ruled in the
employee's favor. Nevertheless, this opportunity did not take place until almost two
years after the initial discharge. The agency denied the employee wages and benefits
during that time. Even when the judge ordered a reinstatement, the agency refused
to award the back pay. Therefore, Oklahoma falls into the category of jurisdictions
that permits state agencies to use their discretion in deciding on the award of back
pay for wrongful termination. A state employee in Oklahoma has no absolute right
to back pay, wages, or benefits.
V. Conclusion
In Ferrell, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma decided that title 51, section 24.1 of
the Oklahoma Statutes applies to all state employees, regardless of their clas-
sification.4 7 The Oklahoma statutes now afford no special treatment to employees
in the Merit Protection System if convicted of a felony. Indeed, the protections for
the Merit System employees are now neither complete nor unassailable, as
demonstrated by Ferrell.
However, the broader implications of this case may be difficult to judge.
Arguably, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma has decided to let state agencies use their
own discretion in awarding back pay for wrongful termination. However, this
interpretation might be questionable, considering the court failed to address this issue.
Nevertheless, absent any statutory or case law on the subject, the court's decision
demonstrated no concern about the prospect of the Military Department denying an
employee back wages.
146. See OKLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1966 amendment).




Conversely, a strict reading of the case could be interpreted as only deciding the
conflict between title 74, section 840-6.5 and title 51, section 24.1 of the Oklahoma
Statutes. If this is a correct interpretation, then Ferrell affects only those employees
that fall under the Merit Protection System. In either case, back pay for an employee
convicted of a felony that is later reversed seems to be at the sole discretion of the
employing agency. While this may seem unfair to the wronged employee or good
management to the employing agency, it is evident this is Oklahoma law.
Tom Ivester
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